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Review
Removal of lead from gasoline in the United 
States has been described as one of the great 
public health achievements of the 20th cen-
tury (Needleman 1998a), but it almost did 
not happen. That it did is a tribute to the 
hard work, tenacity, and independence of a 
critical few scientists and government offi-
cials in the early 1970s. These scientists and 
health officials faced enormous opposition 
but never lost sight of the mandate to protect 
public health.
The initial health-based regulation to 
reduce lead content in gasoline was promul-
gated by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in 1973 (U.S. EPA 1973d). 
This was the first regulatory step in a series 
of actions that dramatically reduced use of 
leaded gasoline and subsequently blood lead 
levels across the world. The dramatic impact 
of the reduction and eventual elimination 
of lead in gasoline is illustrated by the 98% 
reduction in the percentage of U.S. children 
1–5 years of age with elevated blood lead lev-
els (> 10 µg/dL) from the period 1976–1980 
to the period 1999–2002 [Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) 2005].
We, the authors, had the opportunity 
and privilege to play major roles in develop-
ing the rationale for and drafting the initial 
federal health-based regulation to remove 
lead from gasoline. This took place while we 
were both employed by the U.S. EPA during 
1971–1975.
Background
In the early 1970s, 200,000 tons of lead was 
emitted from automobiles in the United States 
each year, mostly in urban areas. Lead was 
added to gasoline to reduce engine knock in 
high-compression engines, which otherwise 
would have required higher-octane gasoline. 
The oil and lead industries, including manu-
facturers of gasoline lead additives, had success-
fully thwarted government efforts to limit lead 
in gasoline for 50 years (Needleman 2000).
The oil and lead industries used various 
strategies to forestall regulation of lead in 
gaso  line. For example, when workers involved 
in the initial manufacture of gasoline lead 
additives suffered severe lead poisoning and 
even deaths, the lead industry blamed the 
victims for failing to follow good work prac-
tices. Another strategy employed by the lead 
industry was to use their public relations 
capabilities to advertise the benefits of their 
products to the general public while casting 
doubt on the possibility of harm associated 
with use of these products (Denworth 2008; 
Michaels 2008; Needleman 2000; Rosner 
and Markowitz 1985). This was particularly 
true in the case of airborne lead: The lead 
industry vigorously claimed that airborne lead 
was a negligible contributor to population 
lead exposure and was not a factor in excessive 
lead exposure in children. The lead industry 
was able to achieve its influence in large part 
by being the primary supporter of research 
on health effects of lead and relying upon the 
scien  tists that it supported to communicate 
and interpret this research to the government 
and the public (Denworth 2008).
As a result, the lead industry was in a 
position to impede the free flow of scientific 
information related to the hazards of lead 
in gasoline, including restrictions on the 
ability to publish this information without 
prior approval (Denworth 2008; Rosner and 
Markowitz 1985). Consequently, the vast 
majority of relevant studies of lead in gasoline 
published until the early 1970s were favorable 
to the lead industries.
To better understand the circumstances 
of the early 1970s, it is important to recognize 
the evolution of environmentalism. The decade 
of the 1960s saw the birth of the environmen-
tal movement in the United States, partly in 
response to the 1962 publication of Rachel 
Carson’s book Silent Spring (Carson 1962). 
This resulted in actions by Congress to create 
new federal agencies around 1970 in response 
to these concerns. These agencies included the 
U.S. EPA, as well as the National Institute 
of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) 
within the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), and expansion of the mission of CDC 
beyond its historic role of protecting the pub-
lic from communicable diseases. Without the 
crea  tion of these agencies and passage of the 
Clean Air Act (Clean Air Act 1970), attribut-
able to Senator Edmund Muskie, it is unlikely 
that the federal government would have been 
able to regulate lead in gasoline. Before 1970, 
there was no federal agency with the clear 
mandate and authority to protect public health 
from environmental hazards.
Creation of these new agencies and their 
expanded environmental health protection 
mandates required that basic process ques-
tions be answered and new regulatory proce-
dures established. Although a huge new area of 
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potential regulatory activity had been created, 
few people were available in 1971 to address 
these new fields. The U.S. EPA was in a startup 
phase similar to the garage workshop phase in 
the development of desktop computers.
Our Involvement in the 
Lead Standard
The story of how we both became involved in 
the issue of lead in gasoline within the U.S. EPA 
has many similarities. We both were newly hired 
U.S. EPA employees in the summer of 1971, 
David Hanson at the Office of Air Programs 
in Durham, North Carolina, and Kenneth 
Bridbord at the National Environmental 
Research Center in Research Triangle Park, 
North Carolina. Hanson was just out of gradu-
ate school and into his first full-time job. The 
same was true for Bridbord, who had just com-
pleted his master of public health degree after 
graduation from medical school and an intern-
ship in pediatrics. 
In late 1971/early 1972, we were both 
transferred to the headquarters of the U.S. 
EPA in Washington, DC. We were young, 
idealistic employees, naive to the ways of 
Washington and not fully understanding the 
challenges and difficulties of the responsibili-
ties that we were soon to inherit. We were 
given these responsibilities mainly because no 
one else was available to address them.
The regulations and supporting documen-
tation that we both worked on were part of a 
series of proposals and actions taken by the 
U.S. EPA in 1972–1973 and the subsequent 
legal challenges and decisions from 1974 
through March 1976.
Late in 1971, Hanson was asked to work 
with other U.S. EPA employees to develop a 
rationale and proposal for regulating lead in 
gasoline. He was moved to the headquarters 
of the U.S. EPA in Washington, DC, to more 
efficiently complete this assignment.
Bridbord’s involvement in the issue of lead 
in gasoline was accidental. The agency needed 
a physician to participate in the press con-
ference announcing the proposal to regulate 
lead in gasoline in February 1972. Bridbord 
was called in because the most senior U.S. 
EPA health official was not available on that 
occasion. Despite youth and in  experience, 
Bridbord inherited primary responsibility 
for the U.S. EPA assessment of health issues 
related to lead in gasoline, and Hanson was 
assigned primary responsibility for the overall 
regulation, of which health was only one part.
When we began our work on the regula-
tions, there were two major issues related to 
lead in gasoline. First, lead inactivated cata-
lytic converters. These devices had become 
the technology of choice for new automobiles 
to achieve U.S. EPA air pollution standards 
for carbon monoxide and photochemical 
oxidants. This required a separate U.S. EPA 
regulation to provide essentially lead-free gas-
oline (no more than 0.05 g/gal, vs. “up to” 
4 g/gal in leaded gasoline) for all new auto-
mobiles with catalytic converters (U.S. EPA 
1973a). Second, there was a health basis to 
reduce lead in gasoline for existing automo-
biles to accelerate reduction of air lead levels 
beyond that achievable by lengthy phase-out 
of older vehicles using leaded gasoline.
In the early 1970s, we experienced con-
siderable resistance to removal of lead from 
gasoline, not only by industry but also by 
government and public health scientists. 
Many scientists asserted that lead in gasoline 
caused no health effects and referred to a large 
number of studies supporting that position. 
Concerns were also raised about the adverse 
impact the regulation would have on com-
panies that manufactured lead additives and 
on the oil company refineries. It was further 
postulated that removing lead would cause gas 
prices to skyrocket.
These concerns were being voiced against 
the backdrop of the 1973 gasoline shortage 
caused by the Arab oil embargo. Cars lined up 
for blocks waiting to gas up, and in some parts 
of the country one could only go to the gas sta-
tion on an even- or an odd-numbered day. The 
argument was made that the lead regulations 
would exacerbate the oil shortage by requiring 
more oil to replace the octane lost by remov-
ing lead. With the gas shortage dominating 
the news, we were informed by certain senior 
executives that removal of lead from gasoline 
was politically impossible. Consequently, it was 
argued, if eliminating lead emissions was neces-
sary, this could be achieved by retrofitting lead 
traps on automobiles. This alternative turned 
out not to be feasible for legal and technical 
reasons (U.S. EPA 1973d).
Resistance to removal of lead from gaso-
line also resulted in a series of efforts to dis-
credit or influence us. In one instance, industry 
representatives held meetings with the U.S. 
EPA administrator in an attempt to discredit 
Bridbord. Another time, Bridbord was required 
to provide 2 days of sworn testimony as part of 
a civil action brought by the major manufac-
turer of gasoline lead additives against the U.S. 
EPA in Richmond, Virginia. This discovery 
deposition was designed to uncover informa-
tion to be used by the lead industry in future 
legal action against the agency and to call into 
question the qualifications of Bridbord. In 
another incident early in 1972, a lobbyist for 
a major manufacturer of lead additives offered 
Hanson employment at a considerable increase 
in salary. In an effort to convince the U.S. 
EPA not to issue the health-based regulation, 
the industry even sent a delegation to try to 
convince the U.S. EPA administrator that the 
lead regulation was not necessary because they 
alleged lead was an essential mineral required 
for optimum growth and development.
Our youth was also used against us. Our 
inexperience was cited as a reason for rejecting 
the lead regulatory proposals at public hear-
ings, during congressional testimonies, and 
then again during subsequent legal challenges. 
At one congressional hearing, Hanson was 
specifically requested by a Texas congressman 
to state his age for the record.
Finally, even more attention was focused 
on this issue because this was the first major 
regulation that the newly formed U.S. EPA 
moved forward on a nationwide basis.
Regulatory Proposals and 
Public Hearings
The U.S. EPA originally proposed a health-
based regulation for lead in gasoline on 
23 February 1972 (U.S. EPA 1972b). Hanson 
coordinated this regulatory effort and wrote 
the proposed regulation. The regulation was 
based on the U.S. EPA’s interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act that it did not require irrefut-
able evidence of harm to take prudent meas-
ures to protect the public against widespread 
lead exposure from automotive emissions.
This proposed regulation for lead in gaso-
line was based upon the document “Health 
Hazards of Lead” principally authored by Carl 
Shy, a senior physician scientist at the U.S. 
EPA in North Carolina (U.S. EPA 1972a, 
1972b). Because this proposal went against 
conventional wisdom, Hanson had difficulty 
finding scientists willing to publicly support 
a health-based regulation. Shy was one of the 
first physicians to come forward and publicly 
support regulation of lead in gasoline even 
though at this time there were few published 
studies to back him up.
The “Health Hazards of Lead” document 
addressed the adverse physiologic effects of 
lead on heme synthesis, particularly at blood 
lead levels > 40 µg/dL. Based upon this docu-
ment, the U.S. EPA concluded that these 
changes were early events leading to more 
serious damage to the nervous system that 
was known to occur at higher blood lead lev-
els, and that air lead levels contributed to high 
blood lead levels. The documents support-
ing the proposal relied upon the Goldsmith-
Hexter regression equation that related blood 
leads to air lead levels (Goldsmith and Hexter 
1967). Based upon this information, the U.S. 
EPA concluded that air lead levels > 2 µg/m3, 
which were common in many urban areas, 
were a contributing factor in the number of 
persons with blood leads exceeding 40 µg/dL. 
Automobile exhausts were the predominant 
contributor to these elevated air lead levels in 
urban areas. As a result, U.S. EPA proposed a 
regulation to keep air lead below this level by 
limiting lead in gasoline (U.S. EPA 1972b).
One argument against the U.S. EPA 
health-based regulation was that there might 
be no need for a health-based standard because Federal regulation on lead in gasoline
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catalytic converters, required to meet auto-
motive emission standards, necessitated use of 
lead-free gasoline in any case. Consequently, 
as older vehicles would be replaced with 
newer ones using catalytic technology, auto-
mobile lead emissions would decrease and 
ambient lead-levels would gradually decline. 
Fortunately, the need for a health-based stan-
dard prevailed. Not only was there a need for 
a health-based regulation to accelerate removal 
of lead from gasoline beyond that achievable 
by phase-out of older vehicles, but also as an 
insurance policy to guard against introduc-
tion of new auto  motive technology that could 
operate with leaded gasoline while achieving 
the other emission standards. Importantly, 
establishing a health rationale to remove lead 
from gasoline in the United States also served 
as an impetus for other nations to take similar 
actions. This was significant because globally 
not all automobiles are required to use cata-
lytic converters.
Public hearings on the initial February 
1972 proposed regulations were organized by 
Hanson. The hearings resulted in many com-
ments on the impact of the proposed regu-
lations on the oil and gas industry and lead 
industry. These two industries accounted for 
most of the testimony at the hearings. They 
testified to the substantial damage they believed 
the regulation would do to their industries, 
including lost profits, the inability to fund 
exploration and development, and difficulties 
in providing affordable gasoline to the pub-
lic. Another concern was that removal of lead 
would endanger the survival of as many as 
50 refineries across the country. In fact, only 
one small older refinery was closed purportedly 
because of the regulations on lead in gasoline.
The health basis for the regulation was also 
aggressively attacked during the public hear-
ings. Arguments against the proposed regula-
tion included concern that replacing lead in 
gasoline with cancer-causing aromatics would 
be even more harmful and that there was no 
documented relationship between blood lead 
in children and lead in gasoline. The indus-
try pressed its viewpoint that air lead was a 
negligible contributor to lead exposure in the 
population and that the U.S. EPA had no evi-
dence to support its position that it was.
As a result, the U.S. EPA reexamined the 
evidence and almost a year later, on 10 January 
1973, reproposed a modified health-based regu-
lation (U.S. EPA 1973b). This regulation was 
supported by a new health document, “EPA’s 
Position on the Health Effects of Airborne 
Lead” (U.S. EPA 1972d), principally authored 
by Bridbord. This document acknowledged 
limitations in existing data on the air lead–
blood lead relationship but also summarized 
the emerging scientific data on risks to children 
from exposure to lead in dirt and dust. The 
document provided evidence that lead in dirt 
and dust was related to distance from roadways 
and consequently to use of lead in gasoline.
The revised proposal was designed to limit 
overall emissions of lead from motor vehicles 
without tying this reduction to achieving a 
specific air lead level, because of the limited 
data available at that time on the air lead–
blood lead relationship. The health rationale 
for the reproposed U.S. EPA regulation was 
based on the concept that reducing lead in 
gasoline would reduce the overall lead burden 
in the United States, particularly for children. 
The rationale for this action was also described 
in a presentation at a major international 
conference on lead held in Amsterdam in the 
fall of 1972 (Greenfield et al. 1973). During 
1973, the U.S. EPA continued to gather addi-
tional information with the intent of moving 
forward with a health-based standard.
The time frame for developing the final 
regulation was accelerated when the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a 
motion in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
U.S. EPA to make a decision on the health-
based regulation. As a result, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals on 28 October 1973 ordered the 
U.S. EPA to make a determination within 
30 days whether to regulate lead in gasoline 
for health reasons (NRDC v. U.S. EPA 1973). 
We both remembered how pleased we were 
when this motion, filed by David Schoenbrod 
of NRDC, was accepted by the courts. This 
increased our optimism that the U.S. EPA 
would now move forward with this regulation. 
We both were asked to continue our work 
on the lead regulations and to lead the effort 
responding to the court order.
As a result, the U.S. EPA promulgated the 
initial health-based regulation on 6 December 
1973, concluding that automobile lead emis-
sions endanger public health (U.S. EPA 
1973d) based upon a third health document, 
“EPA’s Position on the Health Implications of 
Airborne Lead” (U.S. EPA 1973c). Bridbord 
took day-to-day responsibility for coordinat-
ing preparation of the third health document, 
working with a more experienced U.S. EPA 
health scientist, John Buckley. The final rule 
making was informed by additional health-
related information indicating a correlation 
between lead in dirt and dust and blood lead 
levels in children. Appendix 1 summarizes 
the provisions of this regulation, designed to 
achieve a 60–65% reduction in lead emissions 
nationwide by 1980 compared with the 1971 
base period. The rationale for this regulation 
was also described in congressional testimony 
before then Senator Joe Biden (Bridbord 
1974; Quarles 1974).
Health Rationale
In the 1950s and 1960s, the clinical presenta-
tion of lead poisoning in children was associ-
ated primarily with lead paint exposure, and 
major efforts were being made to address the 
lead paint exposure problem during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Lead poisoning in children was 
characterized by overt signs and symptoms, 
including acute and chronic encephalopathy, 
peripheral neuropathy, nephropathy, anemia, 
abdominal pain, and X-ray evidence of lead-
containing paint chips in the abdomen. These 
conditions were associated with blood lead lev-
els in the 60–80 µg/dL range or higher. At 
higher blood lead levels, severe mental retard-
ation and even death were known to occur. 
Although there was concern that less severe 
but still significant effects were occurring at 
lower blood lead levels, the evidence for lower 
level effects at that time was not well estab-
lished. Consequently, there was skepticism in 
the public health community about efforts to 
limit lead exposure from gasoline when the 
problem appeared to be primarily exposure to 
lead paint in deteriorating housing. There was, 
in fact, considerable concern that efforts to 
address lead in gasoline would draw attention 
and resources away from efforts to address the 
lead paint problem.
In the early 1970s, the prevailing belief 
continued to be that the major concern with 
lead was exposure of children to lead-based 
paint. During this period, however, there was 
also increasing evidence of a more generalized 
contamination of the environment caused by 
lead emissions from motor vehicles. This was 
characterized not only by ambient air lead 
levels but also by high levels of lead in dirt 
and dust measured in the thousands of parts 
per million levels. Although the most severe 
cases of lead overexposure were found among 
children living in housing with deteriorating 
lead paint, there also was a more widespread 
blood lead elevation in the general popula-
tion, particularly in children living close to 
heavily trafficked urban roads but not neces-
sarily living in deteriorating housing (U.S. 
EPA 1973d). This represented a second epi-
demic caused by lead in gasoline, in addition 
to the epidemic caused by lead paint.
The U.S. EPA decided not to link the final 
regulation to the originally proposed air lead 
level of 2 µg/m3. This was because the existing 
air lead–blood lead correlation studies did not 
control for the multiple sources of lead expo-
sure in the general population and did not 
account for lead in dirt and dust, which was 
an important source of exposure for children. 
In modifying its position, the U.S. EPA con-
sidered airborne lead to be an important con-
tributor to lead body burden in both children 
and adults, and especially in children, through 
ingestion of dirt and dust contaminated by 
lead from motor vehicle exhausts.
It is noteworthy that the U.S. EPA sub-
sequently did establish a national ambient air 
quality standard for lead of 1.5 µg/m3 in 1978 
and later revised this standard to 0.15 µg/m3 Bridbord and Hanson
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in 2008 (Needleman 2000; U.S. EPA 2008). 
Except for the need to better control lead 
emissions from stationary sources, the one 
action that has generally made it possible to 
meet the original as well as the revised air 
quality standard for lead was the phased 
reduction and ultimate elimination of leaded 
gasoline in the United States.
Interpretation and Use of 
Scientific Information
During the period when the U.S. EPA was 
developing its approach to lead in gasoline, 
the agency had contracted with the National 
Academy of Sciences, National Research 
Council (NRC) for what was anticipated to 
be an independent scientific assessment of air-
borne lead (NRC 1972). However, there was 
concern that the NRC report did not provide 
an independent analysis, because a number of 
panel members, consultants, and contributors 
were affiliated with or had been supported by 
the oil and lead additive industries (Gillette 
1971). Consequently, the report, which was 
released in 1972, was not relied on by the 
U.S. EPA to form the basis for the agency’s 
health assessment of lead in gasoline. In con-
trast, the NRC report was used by the lead 
industry in public relations efforts to say there 
was no health concern with lead in gasoline 
(Denworth 2008; Needleman 2000).
One of the scientists who first called atten-
tion to the risks posed by lead in gasoline was 
Clair Patterson, a highly respected geo  chemist 
at the California Institute of Technology. 
Patterson was among the most prominent 
scientists to raise concern about the need to 
reduce lead emissions from gasoline. Research 
conducted by Patterson documented the great 
buildup of lead in the environment and in 
people because of industrial activity in gen-
eral, and combustion of gasoline containing 
lead additives in particular (Denworth 2008; 
Needleman 1998b, 2000; Patterson 1965). The 
U.S. EPA considered the likelihood that the 
studies and conclusions of Patterson were in 
fact correct, which ultimately they were shown 
to be (Denworth 2008). The main reason that 
the U.S. EPA did not rely on Patterson’s stud-
ies to justify its health basis for removal of lead 
from gasoline was the difficulty in relating 
these findings in a quantitative way to specific 
levels of lead use in gasoline. If the U.S. EPA 
had used the Patterson studies, they would 
have been seen as a major rationale for the 
regu  lation. Given the considerable high-  profile 
effort that the lead industry had expended to 
challenge the studies of Patterson, there was 
concern that if the Patterson studies were suc-
cessfully challenged in any future legal pro-
ceeding, this could jeopardize the health-based 
regulation. As a result, the U.S. EPA decided 
to sidestep the debate over interpretation of 
the Patterson studies and to base its health 
rationale on a broad body of other emerging 
scientific information.
Studies by Philip Landrigan and col-
leagues at the CDC were particularly infor-
mative to U.S. EPA in documenting the 
hazards from exposure to elevated levels of 
lead in dirt around stationary lead sources, 
in particular, the El Paso lead smelter (CDC 
1973; Landrigan et al. 1975). This study was 
one of the first to demonstrate a relationship 
between soil and household dust lead levels 
and blood lead levels in children and young 
adults. Newer studies also provided more 
documentation of high levels of lead in dirt 
and dust near heavily traveled roadways (U.S. 
EPA 1973c, 1973d).
Subsequent  studies  by  Herbert 
Needleman and colleagues documented the 
adverse consequences of low-level lead expo-
sure in children on intelligence and behavior 
(Needleman et al. 1979). Further studies have 
confirmed the correctness of the conclusions 
of Needleman’s research on the effects of 
lead on intelligence and behavior (Denworth 
2008). These studies were based on indepen-
dent peer-reviewed research supported by the 
NIH and especially by the NIEHS, as well as 
the National Institute of Child Health and 
Human Development (NICHD). As a result, 
the scientific community has been better able 
to understand the health risks from exposure 
to lead (Canfield et al. 2003; Cecil et al. 2008; 
Gilbert and Weiss 2006; Jusko et al. 2008; 
Lanphear et al. 2000, 2005; Needleman et al. 
1979, 1990; Wright et al. 2008).
The Scientific Community and 
the Seven Questions
The experience regarding lead in gasoline 
reinforces how vitally important independent 
input from the medical, public health, and 
scientific community is to a federal agency 
developing regulatory policy. Before the U.S. 
EPA paper “Health Effects of Airborne Lead,” 
released in late 1972, an announcement was 
placed in the Federal Register and widely cir-
culated in the scientific community request-
ing responses to seven questions (U.S. EPA 
1972c), which were formulated by Bridbord. 
An example of one of these questions was: 
How much of a hazard is dust-fall lead for 
children? Appendix 2 lists all seven questions.
The Federal Register notice sent by act-
ing U.S. EPA administrator Robert Fri both 
extended the comment period on the February 
1972 health-based proposal and sought wide 
input from the scientific community and other 
government agencies responding to the seven 
questions. This action reflected the U.S. EPA’s 
determination that it had a responsibility to 
reach out to the scien  tific community to seek 
the most recent information related to the 
health hazards of lead under the new Clean 
Air Act authority to protect public health. 
Responses received provided considerable new 
scientific information.
Comments received pointed out limita-
tions of the existing data on the relationship 
between air lead and blood lead, including 
the Goldsmith-Hexter regression equation 
(Goldsmith and Hexter 1967). In place of 
the relationship between air lead and blood 
lead levels, emphasis was now placed on haz-
ards to young children from exposure to lead-
contaminated dirt and dust resulting from 
automotive lead emissions.
Responses to the seven questions not only 
provided invaluable scientific information, but 
also helped to mobilize additional research. 
That research was discussed at a major confer-
ence on low-level lead toxicity convened by 
U.S. EPA and NIEHS in North Carolina in 
October 1973 and subsequently published in 
Environmental Health Perspectives (Low-Level 
Lead Toxicity 1974). Several of the papers 
from the U.S. EPA/NIEHS conference were 
ultimately cited in the third U.S. EPA health 
document (U.S. EPA 1973c), which was used 
as the health basis for the final regulations.
Reactions of Other Federal 
Agencies
The U.S. EPA regulations on lead in gasoline 
were proposed shortly after a major reorgani-
zation in which employees from a number of 
federal agencies were reassigned to staff the 
newly created U.S. EPA. Most U.S. EPA staff 
came from the U.S. Public Health Service 
(PHS), part of the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (DHEW). As a result 
of this reorganization, many U.S. PHS staff 
retired before or shortly after being transferred 
to the U.S. EPA, leaving a vacuum at the 
U.S. EPA that was filled by younger people 
such as ourselves. This created jealousies and 
unhappiness among remaining U.S. PHS and 
U.S. EPA staff. This was one of the reasons 
that DHEW, the department that tradition-
ally addressed air pollution, was so actively 
opposed to a health-based regulation.
In addition, DHEW initially questioned 
whether the U.S. EPA even had the author-
ity to regulate lead in gasoline. The fact that 
DHEW had to share health protection respon-
sibilities with the U.S. EPA may be one of 
the reasons for the consistently strong nega-
tive views on this regulation taken by officials 
in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Health. On one occasion, we met with the 
assistant secretary for health, who was skepti-
cal about the need for this regulation. U.S. 
EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus sent 
DHEW secretary Elliot Richardson a letter 
requesting comments on the above-mentioned 
seven questions. The responses were not very 
supportive. In a communication to Senator 
John Tunney, Richardson was especially criti-
cal of the U.S. EPA taking action to remove Federal regulation on lead in gasoline
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lead from gasoline based upon health consid-
erations, stating that “there is no firm evidence 
at this time that lead derived from combusted 
gasoline is harmful to the health of the gen-
eral public” (Richardson 1973). However, the 
communication to Senator Tunney acknowl-
edged that the U.S. EPA now had the statutory 
authority to take this action.
Ruckelshaus and Richardson, based upon 
advice from their respective staff, had differ-
ing views about the need for a health-based 
standard. Richardson and Ruckelshaus sub-
sequently became the U.S. Attorney General 
and U.S. Deputy Attorney General, respec-
tively, who were later fired by President 
Nixon for failing to dismiss the Watergate 
prosecutor. They obviously had great respect 
for each other even though they had different 
perspectives with regard to lead in gasoline.
Industrial opponents to removal of lead 
from gasoline were very adept at taking advan-
tage of the differing views related to the health 
impact of lead in gasoline and cultivating sup-
port from scientists most concerned with the 
problem of lead in paint. This was also one 
of the reasons why leadership at DHEW dis-
agreed with and actively opposed the health 
rationale used by the U.S. EPA to remove lead 
from gasoline. DHEW and other federal agen-
cies, such as the Department of Transportation 
and Department of Commerce, vigorously 
opposed a health-based regulation at the level 
of the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB).
An important person at OMB who, after 
considering all of the evidence, agreed with 
the U.S. EPA position was John Sawhill, dep-
uty director of the OMB. If it were not for 
Sawhill’s support, the U.S. EPA health-based 
regulation for lead in gasoline would have 
stalled and might never have been promul-
gated. Sawhill was able to support the U.S. 
EPA position because of the very thorough 
research and analyses that had been completed 
by U.S. EPA staff addressing the criticisms and 
questions raised about the proposed regula-
tions. This information enabled us to answer 
and rebut all questions and charges lodged by 
representatives of the other federal agencies 
that were against the regulation. Sawhill later 
became director of the Nature Conservancy.
As a reflection of the evolving views of 
the scientific community, the DHEW 
Committee to Coordinate Toxicology and 
Related Programs in 1975 requested that a 
departmental committee be formed to assess 
the human health consequences of lead expo-
sure from automobile emissions. The results 
of this effort were published in Environmental 
Health Perspectives (Falk 1977). The com-
mittee recommended “phasing-out of lead in 
gasoline by reducing its content as has been 
proposed in the U.S. by EPA and by many 
other developed countries.”
Legal Challenges to the 
Standard
After promulgation of the 1973 U.S. EPA 
health-based lead in gasoline regulation, there 
were a number of legal challenges, which 
included attacks on the authors’ background 
and qualifications. The initial challenge by the 
lead industry, heard by three justices in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals on 9 September 1974, 
resulted in this regulation being set aside on 
28 January 1975 (Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. EPA 
1974). A subsequent appeal heard en banc 
(the entire Court of Appeals panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals in Washington, DC) on 
30 May 1975 resulted in a decision to affirm 
the regulation on 19 March 1976 (Ethyl 
Corp. v. U.S. EPA 1976). The Supreme 
Court ultimately did not agree to hear an 
appeal of this decision, in effect upholding 
the determination of the lower court, allow-
ing the lead phase-down regulation to take 
effect in 1976.
The ability of the U.S. EPA to prevail in 
these legal challenges was attributed both to 
the care that had been taken in developing 
the final regulation and to the dedication and 
competence of U.S. EPA attorneys such as 
Leslie Carothers who presented and defended 
the regulation in subsequent legal challenges. 
The U.S. EPA also benefited by having com-
petent officials such as Rick Penna, who was 
responsible for developing the enforcement 
strategies for the final regulation. The authors 
also very much appreciated the competent sup-
port provided by another U.S. EPA attorney, 
Gerry Gleason, who represented us during 
various depositions and other legal challenges 
by the lead industries.
Observations
Removal of lead from gasoline has been par-
ticularly beneficial for the health of children 
in the United States. In 2005, the CDC docu-
mented a 98% reduction in the percentage 
of U.S. children 1–5 years of age with ele-
vated blood lead levels ( > 10 µg/dL) from the 
period 1976–1980 to the period 1999–2002 
(CDC 2005). Evidence of this decline began 
to appear in the 1980s (Annest et al. 1983; 
CDC 1997; Needleman 2000; Pirkle et al. 
1994). Although reduction of lead exposure 
from a number of sources, particularly food 
and paint, contributed to this decrease, the 
action believed most responsible for this rapid 
and dramatic decline in blood lead levels was 
removal of lead from gasoline (Annest et al. 
1983; Needleman 2000; Pirkle et al. 1994). 
This conclusion is supported by the close tem-
poral relationship between decreased use of 
lead in gasoline and subsequent rapid declines 
in blood lead levels both in the United States 
and in other countries, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. For example, studies on six conti-
nents have documented an extremely strong 
correlation between reductions in blood lead 
and decreased use of lead in gasoline (Thomas 
et al. 1999).
The regulation that we both worked on 
represented the first successful effort by the 
federal government to regulate lead in gasoline 
since questions were raised about this 50 years 
earlier (Needleman 2000). Removal of lead 
from gasoline can be considered the envi-
ronmental health equivalent of removing the 
handle from London’s Broad Street Pump, 
whose contaminated water was the source of 
the 1854 cholera epidemic in London.
As blood lead levels in children have 
decreased, the blood lead level of concern for 
children has also decreased from 40 µg/dL   
in the early 1970s to the current level of   
10 µg/dL. It would not have been possible 
to identify these lower level effects until after 
the gasoline lead phase-out had begun. This is 
because before this time, virtually all children 
in the U.S. had blood levels exceeding the 
10-µg/dL level. With continuing research, 
questions have been raised regarding whether 
blood leads even at or below 10 µg/dL are 
harmful to children (Canfield et al. 2003; 
Jusko et al. 2008; Lanphear et al. 2000, 2005; 
Mead 2008; Needleman et al. 1990).
The effort to remove lead from gasoline 
provides several additional observations. First, 
the ability of the U.S. EPA to take this regula-
tory action was greatly facilitated by research 
conducted by government and independent 
scientists not supported by industry. This illus-
trates the crucial importance of independent 
peer-reviewed research to better understand 
the health consequences of lead exposure in the 
population. This support was primarily pro-
vided by the NIEHS, NICHD, and CDC.
Second, it takes a long time before new 
information affects medical and public health 
practice. It was not until the results of this 
research began to appear in high-impact scien-
tific journals such as the New England Journal 
of Medicine that the medical and public health 
communities more fully appreciated the haz-
ards posed by lead, including airborne and 
dust-fall lead in general and lead in gasoline 
in particular (Annest et al. 1983; Landrigan 
Figure 1. Parallel decreases in blood lead values 
and amounts of lead consumed in gasoline between 
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et al. 1975; Lin-Fu 1972, 1973a, 1973b; 
Needleman et al. 1979, 1990).
Third is the importance of basing regula-
tory decisions on a broad foundation of scien-
tific studies so that legal challenges are not 
easily able to attack the credibility of a single 
or a limited number of studies or individuals. 
This was a consideration in the U.S. EPA not 
tying the final health-based regulation to a spe-
cific air lead level, which would have required 
relying on the Goldsmith-Hexter regression 
equation, an approach that had been criticized 
both during the first public hearing and by 
independent scientists in response to the seven 
questions outlined in Appendix 2 (Goldsmith 
and Hexter 1967; U.S. EPA 1972d). The 
subsequent unsuccessful attempt by the lead 
industries to discredit the findings of Herbert 
Needleman in an effort to call into question 
the health basis to regulate lead in gasoline in 
the 1980s and the early 1990s also illustrates 
this point (Denworth 2008; Needleman 1992; 
Palca 1992; Rosner and Markowitz 2005; 
Silbergeld 1995).
Fourth, development of a health-based stan-
dard to remove lead from gasoline would not 
have been possible without the support of the 
U.S. EPA leadership. This support was essential 
in providing us the time and opportunity to 
build the strongest case for the removal of lead 
from gasoline to protect public health under 
the Clean Air Act authority. Leadership support 
was provided by the U.S. EPA adminis  trators, 
acting administrators, and deputy adminis-
trators William Ruckelshaus, Russell Train, 
Robert Fri, and John Quarles, along with assis-
tant administrators Robert Sansom and Stanley 
Greenfield. Other U.S. EPA health officials 
who provided invaluable support in develop-
ing the health justification for this action were 
Vaun Newill, Robert Horton, John Buckley, 
Carl Shy, and John “Jack” Finklea.
Addendum
It is beyond the scope of this article to recognize all of the other persons who over the years have 
made important contributions to reduction of lead exposure, not only from gasoline but also 
from other sources, particularly lead in paint and food. A more comprehensive account of the 
contributions of these individuals can be found in Lydia Denworth’s book Toxic Truth (2008).
Members of the task force who contributed to the third U.S. EPA health document, 
in addition to John Buckley and Kenneth Bridbord, included Douglas Hammer, Robert 
Horton, Marty Kanarek, Wellington Moore, Magnus Piscator, Lawrence Plumlee, Steven 
Reznek, Richard Rhoden, and Jerry Stara (U.S. EPA 1973c).
Members of the committee who contributed to the 1975 DHEW report on lead expo-
sure from automobile emissions in addition to Hans Falk included Terri Damstra, Kathryn 
Mahaffey, Warren Piver, and Herbert Posner (Falk 1977).
The initial lead in gasoline phase-down and subsequent U.S. EPA regulations would not 
have been possible without significant support from the scientific community. Based upon the 
personal knowledge of the authors, these individuals include, but are not limited to, scientists 
such as Herbert Needleman, Sergio Piomelli, and Ellen Silbergeld, as well as health officials 
at other federal and state agencies, such as Philip Landrigan, Vernon Houk, Edward Baker, 
and Henry Falk at CDC; Jane Lin-Fu at DHEW; John Goldsmith from the California State 
Health Department; and David Rall, Director of NIEHS. The three papers published in the 
New England Journal of Medicine by Jane Lin-Fu (1972, 1973a, 1973b) were especially influ-
ential in helping the scientific community, including those at the U.S. EPA, to reassess the 
situation with respect to lead exposure and its implications in the United States.
Regulations once promulgated must be upheld and enforced to do their job. Joel Schwartz, 
who followed us at the U.S. EPA, deserves major credit for his role in preventing the regula-
tion that we worked on from being undone during the antiregulatory era of the 1980s and 
for conducting the analyses that ultimately formed the basis for total elimination of lead in 
gasoline in the United States. These analyses included the data in Figure 1, which show a close 
relationship between decreases in blood leads and reduction of leaded gasoline use resulting 
from the initial lead phase-down regulations that we both were responsible for (Annest et al. 
1983; U.S. EPA 1986).
Subsequent to our own involvement, both Joel Schwartz and Ellen Silbergeld were 
recipients of MacArthur Awards for their important work on lead (Denworth 2008; Schmidt 
2005). Herbert Needleman received the Heinz Award for the Environment for his major 
contributions to lead research and regulatory policy (Denworth 2008).
One person who is widely recognized for her contributions in reducing dietary lead 
exposure is Kathryn Mahaffey while at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Denworth 
2008). Kathryn Mahaffey is also the person who requested that lead be included in the 
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey which made possible documentation of 
the decreasing trends in blood leads in the U.S. population as shown, for example, in Figure 1 
(Denworth 2008; see also Anonymous 2009).
Appendix 1 
Provisions of the 1973 U.S. EPA Health-Based Lead Phase-Down Regulation:  
Limits on Allowable Levels of Lead in Gasoline






For each 3-month period (January–March, April–June, July–September, October–
December), the average lead content per gallon shall be computed by dividing total grams 
of lead used at a refinery in the manufacture of gasoline by total gallons of gasoline manufac-
tured at such refinery.
Appendix 2 
Synopsis of the U.S. EPA’s Seven Questions 
(U.S. EPA 1972c)
•	What	are	the	permissible	uses	and	limita-
tions of the Goldsmith-Hexter regression 
equation for obtaining reasonable esti-
mates of blood lead levels as a function of 
air lead exposure?
•	How	accurate	a	reflection	is	blood	lead	of	
lead body burden, and what is the effect of 
elevated blood lead upon lead body burden?
•	How	accurate	are	estimates	used	by	the	U.S.	
EPA, which were contained in an NRC 
report, for estimates of daily air inspired by 
an average adult?
•	What	is	an	appropriate	safety	factor	for	
extrapolating industrial threshold limit 
values to the general population, and is 





environmental sources of lead exposure, 
besides lead paint, be in helping to reduce 
the risk of undue lead exposure among 
children also exposed to lead paint? How 
clear is it that all lead poisoning in chil-
dren is, in fact, caused only by lead paint?
•	What	is	the	consequence	upon	the	envi-
ronment in general of allowing large 
quantities of lead to be expelled into the 
atmosphere from motor vehicle exhausts?Federal regulation on lead in gasoline
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Fifth, in the early 1970s, scientists at U.S. 
EPA were free to examine and evaluate the 
growing body of scientific evidence as the basis 
for the initial health-based regulation. At no 
time was there ever internal U.S. EPA political 
pressure to change scientific interpretations 
or conclusions. The initial U.S. EPA health-
based regulation to remove lead from gasoline 
is clearly an example where science successfully 
affected public policy. The leadership of the 
U.S. EPA at that time deserves much credit 
for establishing an atmosphere in which this 
was possible.
Sixth is the critical role played by non-
governmental organizations, such as the 
NRDC, in influencing regulatory policies. 
David Schoenbrod from the NRDC deserves 
major credit for the role that the NRDC 
played in legally challenging the U.S. EPA 
to take regu  latory action to remove lead from 
gasoline.
Seventh, we were given the opportunity to 
succeed because we were expected to fail. One 
of the reasons we did not receive more opposi-
tion from skeptics within the U.S. EPA was 
that very few people there believed we could 
succeed, so they just left us alone. One high-
placed U.S. EPA official openly stated that 
with the lines at the gas pumps and the strong 
industry opposition, we did not have a chance 
and that we were merely sacrificial lambs. This 
was further supported by the fact that Hanson 
was sent to OMB alone to defend the second 
proposed lead regulation in front of repre-
sentatives of the various federal agencies in 
much higher positions than Hanson. He later 
learned that he was sent alone, as a relatively 
low-level agency representative, because many 
expected this effort to fail.
Finally, in retrospect, our youth and 
in  experience also helped us to succeed. We 
were too young to know that regulating 
lead in gasoline was impossible. Our youth-
ful dedi  cation, hard work, and competent 
analyses overcame obstacles that were much 
more formidable than we recognized. The 
two authors of this paper were recognized for 
their contributions to the lead regulation at 
an unusually young age as recipients of Silver 
Medals for Superior Service by the U.S. EPA, 
the second highest award given by the agency.
We both consider ourselves privileged to 
have had the opportunity to contribute to this 
action, which has had such a beneficial impact 
in the United States as well as in many other 
countries.
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